I have been reading The Technology Liberation Front (libertarians critiquing developments in the fields of the internet and technology) and came across Tim Lee's repost of the popular webcomic XKCD regarding End-User License Agreements (EULA) with a question, "Legally enforceable?"
Wendy Grossman explained the legal gray area that surrounds every EULA software companies use for their softwares:
If you did read the terms, you might be surprised. Eulas typically
specify that the software's publisher is not liable if anything goes
wrong. They typically specify the publisher's preferred jurisdiction
for legal disputes. And some are even more restrictive: some graphics
packages have been known to specify that they cannot be used in the
production of pornographic images. Yet these licences are, as Hanlon
complained, not really contracts: you generally cannot read them before
you buy (rather than use) the software, and you can't negotiate terms.
I have tackled the question before in Copyfascism Watch, where I raised another point that EULAs are not voluntary contracts as they are not agreed upon prior to the purchase of the software. And there is the bizarre claim by manufacturers that consumers are merely purchasing the physical CDs and not the software it contains. I asked, "How legitimate are the claims of
manufacturers that consumers are merely buying the CDs and not the
permission to install and use the software for which the consumer
(rightly, I might add) believed he is paying?"
Jeffrey Tucker of the Mises Blog responded:
[R]estrictive covenants do this all the time with houses for example. You
buy the house in a particular neighborhood and it is really yours, but
you can't paint your shutters pink and you have to mow your grass and
can't leave a sofa on the porch etc. Why can't EULAs amount to a sort
of covenant?
In the Mises Blog, Tucker also asked this question, "Are EULAs contrary to property rights?" Tucker seems to be of notion that is similar to a covenant, but therein lies the issue and the difference between physical property covenants and EULAs: covenants are known and agreed upon prior to purchase, EULAs are hidden contracts that is then revealed to you after the purchase.
A commenter named PR raised the same point:
Since the EULA isn't revealed until after the buyer has handed over his
money, of course it shouldn't be considered a valid agreement. All the
examples of convenants I know of are presented to the buyer before the
sale, but a EULA is more like a legal Trojan horse that restricts the
use of property one already owns.
Many of the responses seem to miss that point and the important issue regarding this unconscionable agreements: it is secret, it is hidden, and cannot be agreed to prior to purchase. A commenter pointed out that you can always return the software, but most stores I purchase software from only have a return-policy for unopened boxes of software. Of course, one can argue that one can choose not to patronize the store that has taken one's money for a software crippled by an agreement one cannot agree to prior to purchase and afterwards, but since when do libertarians make excuses for theft?
Undermining the intent of the Constitution, whose daily perversion is the main product of politics nowadays, has a long tradition in America that took its course practically from the time the Constitution was instituted.
One of the most powerful sources of the perversion of the Constitution, possibly THE most important, is the result of merging two entirely different tasks of the legislative in one and the same representative body.
Hence, my above proposal to strictly separate Legislative I (concerned with Law proper) and Legislative II (concerned with derivative Law).
Legislative II issues commands, directives, propositions designed to manage specifically for specific purposes (like how the police should be organised, which budget it should be given etc.)
So long as such directives are applied to legitimate tasks of the executive, i.e. tasks compatible with the Constitution and the rule of law, there is nothing wrong with issuing rather specific commands (compatible with and subservient to Law proper).
However, if you merge the power to instruct people specifically what they are to do with the altogether different task of stating generally applicable rules of just conduct (Law proper, the concern of Legislative I) you are bound to end up with a government that uses the dignity of Law proper to interfere concretely in a million different things that are not the responsibility of the Executive (which is effectively instructed by the Legislative). By this system, Government decides which "rules" it is to follow, it makes its own "rules" at will. That's tyranny.
When the fundamental difference between Law proper (a legal system consciously and adamantly maintained to preclude the humouring of special interests) and derivative Law (my term), which does have specific concerns in mind, escapes people's minds (which it has for a very long time), the sense of what a government's true responsibilities (and the attendant limits of these responsibilities) are disappears.
Law (in the sense of the products, any products of the legislative) becomes a blend sharing the dignity of the rule of law and the arbitrary power of an institution pretending to have the ability and the mandate to micromanage an entire society.